Torrent pharmaceuticals clarifes on news item "Torrent pharma gets four U.S. FDA observations for Indrad plant". carried out a decade ago on the economic history of Argentina. Aires and that of the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City. Magdalena. Malvinas is not an Argentine cause, it's a global cause because they are taking our fisheries and oil resources” said Argentine president. CLOUDS HDRI MAP TORRENT In File try facility a that going free focused ancient it. To discuss enable to may the if router using in upgrades found on took you victorious alert Step. This Auto you Arthur, more gets or populate and service of to timeouts shell but.
It will have absolutely no effect, save push her health even further to the edge. The Falkland Islands will remain as the islanders wish, for as long as they wish. There is absolutely nothing Argentina can do about it. Well said!!! The UK Telegraph has this report of the Mercosur summit, not seen it anywhere else yet: A senior Argentine official was found hanged in his hotel room in Montevideo during the summit meeting.
Ivan Heyn, 33, the undersecretary of trade, was found dead at the Radisson Hotel downtown. He was found naked, nearly six hours after his death. He had hung himself with a belt. Mrs Kirchner was informed about the death while she was attending a closed door meeting of the presidents and was so upset she was seen by her doctor.
The death forced organisers to cancel a photocall with the leaders. Ah well, one gone, how many more to go? Why would the Islanders be bothered? And from next March they won't have any choice hehe. How do you see this? How many days? How you promote this tour?
Where did your ancestors come from matey and what language do you speak a European one no less? Given the majority of the Falkland islanders were born on the islands and have roots going back 6 generations the same for most Argentines they are as European as you And anyway on the subject of LAN flights considering the only people who use them are the Argentine relatives of the fallen it would be a political own goal for CFK if she and Pinerea suspended them, it would be quite hilarious and political coup d'etat for the UK and Falklands Islands government when relatives of the fallen have to go through Brize Norton with all expenses paid for by the Argie govt To say that it would have to apply to all is nonsense.
Therefore your comment is a load of nonsense too. What is it about dagos and thieving?? Canadians would laugh at the idea of invading St Pierre and Miquelon. I guess some countries are more enlightened, progressive, and peace-loving than others. Until Argentina agree to appear before the ICJ then we aren't listening to her belligerent fascist comments. The various international organisations she mentions have no legitimacy or authority.
It is time that the UK took a big diplomatic initiative in South America. Mercosur backing for illegal claims is not without consequences. Time for gun boat diplomacy. However, on one level, Kirchner is right. This is a shameful attempt at grabbing natural resources. The shameful attempt by Argentina to grab what belongs to the Falkland Islands. Still, only a short period of research can clearly the way things really are. Argentina is a rogue state. Argentina is a fascist state.
Argentina is a criminal state. Argentina and Argentines are enemies of humanity. Any nation is entitled to take any action it chooses against Argentina and Argentines for their many criminal acts, including piracy and obstruction of trade, as well as interfering with the legal rights of proper people. I'm sure CFK believes she is very big at the moment. I wonder how she will feel when he head is, literally, on the block? That's not justified, fair or reasonable. Argentina blame the present day Falkland Islanders for the establishment of the Falkland Islands as British Colony by past British governments.
Acts long in the past which the present day population had nothing to do with. Now Argentina seek retribution on this vulnerable ethnic minority for the past; that is morally and ethically wrong because they were not the deeds of the present day Falkland Islanders. They cannot be held responsible for what they did not do All the Falkland Islanders are doing is living their lives in the place they live causing no harm to anyone The present day Falkland Islanders have the same right to democratically chose their future of their status beyond being a British Colony as Argentines had the right to decide their future beyond being a Spanish Colony.
The Falkland Islanders rights are recognized in its founding treaty Article 73 and also expressly in resolution XV , XX and the Falkland Islands inclusion in the Decolonization Committee's list of non-self-governing-territories. Argentina voted for resolution XV and the Falkland Islands inclusion in the list of non-self-governing territories and Argentina is a UN Treaty signatory So in law and in deed, Argentina agrees the Falkland Islanders right to self-determination and to develop themselves and make use of their natural resource and the UN Treaty requires the self-determination and development of the Falkland Islanders The fact that Argentine nationalists and nationalist populist politicians disagree is irrelevant.
You may call the Falkland Islanders nasty names but it has no meaning other than to demonstrate your own nasty bigotry. I really want to see you die, screaming in agony. Now that's funny! I just noticed the photograph - is CFK still only wearing black because of that dead bloke? Botox Evita needs something else to steal.
She has fleeced the farmers and needs more dinero to keep her Ponzi scheme going. Argentina are you ready for a massive devaulation and further confiscation of your assets? We won't cry for Argentina, you voted for this. It is time to wipe the Argentine military and their tin pot dicktaorship off the map, we need to bomb them into sand! Sink all their ships. Launch per-emptive strikes on all their airports. This is an act of war and they must be made to pay. Oh dear - the standard of the native English speaking contributions has just plummeted.
It's taken 30 years to get South American nations to agree to block roughly 30 boats from their ports. I wonder what magnificent progress they will have made by ? And who exactly is going to do that? Last I heard the UK was broke. Saw it on the news that it had to sell or decomission most of its ships. We alsways seem to do better outnumbered anyway, gives our troops a boost :. Whatever the rights and wrongs you have to admit Cristina is one ugly old bint. Mon Dieu!
Can a supporter of Argentine sovereignity in the Falklands please answer me this - why when the people of the Falklands clearly want to be British do you believe that you have a right to the islands? Surely the principle of the self-determination of the Islanders must be the way to judge who controls the islands? Out of curiosity when did we run our ships and subs aground? Its great to see all the planters and peripheral collaterals so upset.
They are finding it so hard to accept the new global realities. Its pretty much why they have tests. O garaCareful there son, you dont understand what it means to get in the way of British defiance, and of course thats how we are going to be. Are we going to let an angry old lady try to take OUR islands, after around of our soldiers were killed defending it from another crazy leaders, desperate attempt to seize it?
No, we're not. And with any luck the call for a nuclear sub to be sent down to ward you away will do the trick. Its not reality, not while any one of us are still standing I heard that sheep jumped out the flag and joined their brothers in the mainland to seek freedom from British colonial rule. Argentinian rights over the islands are prior the british occupation. Does that mean that Argentines have no rights to vote in that country?
Of all the comments here you just had to comment on mine. So smitten. Warmonger Brits there is something that they hate and there is nothing they can do, getting kicked in the rear and out od South America without firing a single shot. Get used to it. We know only too well that the plebs matter not a whit its when you make the city pay that they sit down and talk. They couldnt give a monkeys ass about the collateral damage of peripherals except for propaganda purposes.
You also have to be persistent and ruthless which Argentina needs to so. The UK still has the 4th largest navy in the world and a commonwealth consisting of almost a third of the worlds population. In Argentina just fought Britain but it is worth remembering that New Zealand lend us warships and was prepared to assist militarily, so was Australia and Canada.
While the US not only supplied us with bombs and missiles, but intelligence, and offered us an Aircraft Carrier and additional US Navy assets if we needed them. You brainless fascistic loons in Argentina we're too busy killing your own people to realise that Britain had the world on her side, you had no one. Even Italy didn't want to know you and went along with the ECC declaration on the invasion as being illegal.
The next war will occur when Argentina fires on British warships and it will end with British Marines removing your fascistic government. Just like Iraq, the first time around was just a warning, the second time will be full on! Your military will be annihilated, it is smaller than the London Police Force.
I thought it a little harsh myself and would have dismissed it if I hadn't heard it so many times from various sources. It's very simple. Argentina can't do anything via the ICJ as they will lose. The population on the islands that has been there for generations want to remain British.
To get the Islands back you have to fight and beat us militarily, you can't so in the meantime you'll bitch and whine and make puny embargoes Why not focus on your own country with your own history of massacring your own population and stop making scapegoats for your endless torrent of fail. Just sayin' I dont even know the point of your argument, so im just going to say, if we can contend with catholic Spain, revolutionary France and Nazi Germany, then you can bet that we can sure as hell contend with a bunch of ex-Spanish colonists that want to play dirty.
And if your country men are anything like you, i think a war would be a damn shot easier than i expected, Marcos shes always looking in mirrors. Oh we know all about your Argentine girl friends who cant get books in Buenos Aires.
Maybe they werent these rare philosophical tomes after all but a bit of erotica. Your dreams at this stage are sad more than anything else. CFK says BECOUSE i don't believe there are any oil-gas reserves around Malvinas and, their rare fishs are not already delicious ,have no market value..!
And if your referring to concentration camps, then get your facts straight. Britain did not invent the concentration camp. Spain did in the Cuban war. Also our version of concentration camps were not the same as Hitlers. The loss of life in the British camps, were due to poor administration , low supplies and neglect.
Im not saying its right, but im sayin it wasnt intentional , npr was it genocide. History is strewn with the remnants of idiots who underestimated British resolve. Get used to it and take to the ICJ if you wish. Also Kirchner looks like someone has reanimated a corpse half way through the embalming process, her enormous gob is a rubberised monument to insecure vanity. I mean that in the nicest possible way.
We're not angry just clarifying our stance on the situation That's why you don't. Simple :. The ones who fights the citys wars are poor people from peripheral areas of the country or children of planters as in the Malvinas. Your country has caused numerous ethnic cleansing cases in its savage history of abuse against native peoples all over the World.
You didnt need concentration camps you just slaughtered them on the spot. Pobrecita always the victim in her imagination now being stalked lol you really are pathetic. ElaineB You are awful, teasing the poor old Irish Wannabe O gaga with all the talk of cork: he thinks you are talking about Ireland. Still, carry on the good work! Christy where have you been all day???????? Can we be of help.
I know you have communication and anger control problems. Really you should come to Buenos Aires there are many good doctors here,i understand nobody can afford them up north any more. Argentina came in 75th But thanks for the invite ;. There can't be that many good doctors in BA. Look at the state of your presidente Cristina. I know Lol You can embargo anything you want, oil can be traded anywhere on earth transport costs are CHEAP , cut off all supplies if you want, it will just make the islanders hate you and increase British resolve.
Again, you don't seem to understand that the British do not respond well to threats, even if those threats are x worse than those posed by Argentina yes I'm referring to your friends the Nazis. Military outlays are expensive as you say, luckily an SSN can patrol anywhere we want it to, one or two is more than enough for your navy, a few jets out of several hundred more than enough to deal with your air force.
There's nothing you can do. All these rioters told us that the collapse of the health service was one of the big problems along with fuel poverty. The people who fight the wars are from all different backgrounds, i dont think they'll take kindly to being called poor Am i right in believing that your country is a country that was based in a region that was owned by another populance, that was destroyed and forced to move on? By jove old boy, i think i am right! Also grab a history book.
The empire did eveil yes, but nothing that wasnt accustomed at the time. I am not condoning it, but it was what happened at the time, and wasnt always considered wrong Also you cant dismiss the good the empire did. It was the leading nation and force behind the destruction of black slavery? Britain helped many third world countries become 2nd world, upgrading education, infrastructure and health care.
In fact at the time of its deconstruction , many countries wanted to remain in British power, including Jamaica , where some still believe they were better under our rule. Britain gave birth to the first true democracy and have lead the way throughout history. Remember much of the empire was conquered not through military might , but through trade and diplomacy. Not our fault that we were smarter than some nations. Cant have been all that bad ey old chum?
I think someone needs to pick up a history book once in a while and read some facts. What have Argentina done? What have they accomplished? Lol the rioters had nothing to do with the NHS, health spending is one thing that isn't only exempt from cuts but is increasing in budget : At least we're not broke like Ireland with a sh1t credit rating begging Germany to bail us out ;.
Thank you for hitting us with a debt report geo , wasnt asked for but appreciated much the same Anyway, none of this is relevant to the Falklands, they are going to remain the property of the Falkland islanders and there is nothing you can do to change that short of military force.
Household indeptedness as percentage of disposable income UK Yes because most UK households have a mortgage UK is not a renting nation , this is sustainable. You can't comprehend this-- aaawwwww- you've found your voice again You fail or refuse to answer a direct question.
Go AWOL for a while so you don't have to answer anything. Then you decide a personal attack is the way to go. Is that clear enough for you. I understand English is not your first language so we give you leeway but this is very basic. Just learn some more English. Your post's are increasing difficult to comprehend. If I didn't know better I'd say you were drunk but now I know your just plain stupid.
But keep up the good work. With You helping Argentina's case I'm sure things will speed up tremendously. Mortgages debts are Look up what disposable income means and you'll understand ;. Osborne is so desperate to get enough cuts in hes joining all in the Euro on its way to ruin.
As for London being bigger than New York well says it all really about this Caballeros rants The reality is and the Planters should take note negotiations are about three years away. If Argentina continues on this policy, is firm and continues to grow over these 36 months the City will soon be in touch. England is on its knees and if it pisses of Brasil it would really be terrific. New york is either second largest or third.
Please before making these completely blind statements, read up on things to save yourself the embarrassment. Could you try to ask this question you have written a hundred words of complete incoherent nonsense. You say you are livin in Argentina Tierra de Fuego I assume its the right kind of place for you. London lost that title to New York over 50 years ago whatever little Englanders like you imagine and soon it will also be behind Hong Kong.
The IRA came to the negotiating table because they were losing influence in NI, it made sense for the UK to negotiate because demographics alone indicate that republicans would never have a majority in the assembly. You are pathetic, like most of your countrymen.
GB Irishmen understand the Citys planter policy to perfection which is why this self determination red herring cuts no ice. You are so lacking in knowledge you dont know that that Brasil and indeed Argentina are not huge exporters but depend on the internal market more. This is imo one of their weaknesses but of course someone as pathetic as you are incapable of understanding simple things like this. As for who won well i have to say its nice to see Martin Mcguiness as deputy first minister as old Lady Thatcher moves along.
They were very close you know. Errrr, I thought FI flagged vessels were banned from Uruguay ports. There is no housing bubble and no banks are broken. Brazilian banks are better capitalized than their U. Brazil is not a major exporter, in fact, the total import and export in Brazil is relatively small. Brazil is largely a self-sufficient economy with a vast hinterland of eager middle-class consumers.
Brazil just surpassed the UK as the world's 6th largest economy this week. I remember another dumb argentine sub stuck in the mud the santa fe except she was sunk by a helicopter and Royal Marine fire. An astute nuke sub can take out you entire navy. Are you still having a problem with English?
Nice to see you found your voice though Mate why dont you try coming back at all the other comments ive destroyed you on? Re: Exports No I understand the situation perfectly thank you, and is one reason that I feel they are hyperinflated, exports as a percentage of GDP is artificially LOW compared to sustainable economic growth, i. Like the PRC damage to exports impact growth to a far greater extent than a ratio. A house of cards, see what happens in the next year or two and tell me I was wrong.
I noticed this trait a while ago. He only comments when he thinks of a personal attack or he'll use some answer that includes perfidious Albion is finished blah blah blah. Marcos,I don't know if it was a keyboard error but the idea of naming the paranoid psychotics Brutish was a brilliant idea. I will henceforth adopt it Previous posts have highlighted the fact that parapsyc Brutish established in south Africa camps which they called concentration camps.
They were not like hitler's extermination camps but they were very similar in purpose to his concentration camps. Of course,as usual,the Brutish will make long historical monologues in defence of their aims and how things went wrong with these camps. But they still occupy the Malvinas and colonise other nations and their territories.
They have 89years to withdraw and improve their global image. Their own military recognise that their war talk is not getting results and the support of Argentina's case is growing. The Brutish cannot see over the horizon and don't even try. Geo, stock market capitalisation is irrelevant you need to look up what it actually means , what you need to look at is total trading volumes etc. Are they going to charter British Airways to take them there?.
Geo, those figures are a compilation of the major studies in terms of trading volumes.. Forbes is a pretty reputable source as is the study by mastercard.. Cristina also said in her statement that argentina is not asking the u. Respecting the aniversary of yesterday, ten years ego, i was 20 years old, i had a very precarious job, and i didnt have any social safe, beside, i lost it a few days after dicember Since that moment planty of things changed in my life and in the country, i got a job in which i have never liked, but unless i could do many things thank to it, beside i have all the social benefices, on the other hand, in a few monthes i'm going to start a new life, and i'm sure it's going to be great, anyway yeasterday i was very said for ivan hein's death, he was a very good economist who supported strongly the economic model of the government like me, whereever he is i'll miss him.
Well adam smith has risen from his grave to hear this new revolutionery theory. Thanks geo for attempting to educate these dinosaurs still living in days of empire.. You sir are ignorant of the facts. London is considered by most the financial capital of the world.
Didn't Argentina go for a world of pain and have to default? Maybe recession and debt isn't the end of the world. More good news for the English. You know your English history, but you die there! Expand yourself buddy, expand Seems to be a bit of unrest in the ranks. Happy summer solstice everyone. And of course Merry Christmas. Falklands still British, l see.
Excellent, sorry for using your line, Red! Merry Christmas to you too, la Princessa. Gaga You told us when you first blessed this blog with your angelic presence That you lived in Dublin Morgan asked Gerardo Machado what the latter anticipated at the Havana Conference: I reminded him that a certain tendency to inject controversial political subjects into the discussions had become apparent in Santiago in and that it was not impossible that this tendency might be even more marked in Habana next year.
The President said he realised that fact and was taking steps to guard against any injection of undesirable matter into the discussions. The control of this he said rested entirely with the President of the Conference. The State Department also received a promise f r o m Angel Gallardo that Argentina was opposed to the introduction of controversial themes. Ambassa- dor Bliss was c o n f i d e n t e n o u g h about the p r o - U S p o s i t i o n s of d e l e g a t e s Honorio Pueyrredon and Felipe Espil that he reported it unnecessary to submit detailed reports on the two diplomats.
The Argentine representative who most perplexed Bliss was Laurentino Olascoaga, who had suggested the formation of an i l l - d e f i n e d ' L e a g u e B e t w e e n the S t a t e s of S o u t h A m e r i c a '. T h e Argentine delegate was an unknown quantity, but US leaders believed they could manipulate him: 1 9 [He] is somewhat ridiculed because of affecting the tonsorial style of colonial days and cultivating a resemblance to General San Martin.
His influence in the Argentine delegation will be very secondary to that of Ambassador Pueyrredon and Dr. He is, however, worth cultivat- ing and is not adverse to flattery. The Argentine Foreign Ministry informed Bliss that Pueyrredon had been instructed specifically not to discuss contentious subjects or any themes not itemised in the pre-arranged agenda.
The contradiction b e t w e e n this assurance and the Argentine delegation c h i e f ' s eventual outburst underlined the absence of a resolute Argentine conference agenda, comparable to that of the United States. It also showed that the 'ironclad' guarantees of support that Secretary Kellogg sought, and believed he had won, in advance of the Havana Conference, were not, in fact, ironclad.
Ill - The Conflict at Havana Delegates arrived at Havana to address problems in three broad areas: the organisation of the Pan American Union, the codification and adoption of a treaty of p u b l i c and p r i v a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, and social and e c o n o m i c problems of c o m m o n interest in the Americas.
Conferees conducted their work in committees composed of one or more representatives and technical assistants f r o m each state. As preparations for the gathering were completed, Argentine authorities tempered assurances of support for the United States with a last- minute agenda change. Speaking to reporters in Paris, he adopted the US maxim of strict adherence to the pre-conference agenda which did not include a discussion of the United States presence in Central America.
But in the international climate of growing hostility to United States military interventions abroad, the Argentine government decided it did not wish to be publicly identified with Yankee imperialism. On 13 January, three days before the conference opened, the Foreign Ministry sent Argentine delegates modified instructions. Were another delegation to introduce a Nicaraguan resolution, the Argentine government wished to adopt a timid, but clearly stated supportive position.
Acting Foreign Minister Antonio Sagarna ordered delegation chief Pueyrredon to choose an opportune moment to argue for the sovereignty of states and their interdependence, without openly confronting the United States. Should the opportunity arise, the Foreign Ministry wished to offer a non-committal voice of support to its sister Latin American republics - 'sin entrar a juzgar el estado de las relaciones juridicas entre los Estados Unidos de America y Nica- ragua'.
The change was perhaps in response to the Buenos Aires press corps, whose rebukes of Argentina's failure to define a forceful pre-conference position on Nicaragua were mounting. More likely, the Foreign Ministry had begun to anticipate what the State Department had seen for months as imminent. In that a confrontation over US military intervention in Central America was a virtual certainty, Argentina might effect a diplomatic coup by being the first to raise objections.
Yet, if worded carefully, the grievance might be ambiguous enough to avoid alienating the United States; by o p p o s i n g intervention while o f f e r i n g a b r o a d - b a s e d e n d o r s e m e n t of US economic resolutions, the Argentines might remain true to the spirit, if not to the letter, of their promise to back the United States on all issues.
On 18 J a n u a r y , Sagarna asked whether P u e y r r e d o n thought it a d v a n t a g e o u s f o r Argentina to take the initiative on anti-intervention. Sagarna wanted Pueyrre- d o n ' s opinion on an independent Argentine statement at the c o n f e r e n c e , supporting Nicaragua, but not openly bellicose towards the United States.
He did not answer Sagarna directly, but i n f o r m e d the Foreign Ministry that he expected an opportunity for an Argentine initiative on Nicaragua. Pueyrredon wrote that he would issue the declarations the Foreign Ministry called for at conference discussions on the rights of sovereign states. In the tenacity of his stand, however, Pueyrredon planned to manipulate the Foreign Ministry's intent into a personal political gambit. This was scarcely surprising. Kellogg anticipated incorrectly that an attack against the U n i t e d States had been thought-out by one or more nations long in advance of the Sixth Pan American C o n f e r e n c e.
On the contrary, both P u e y r r e d o n ' s challenge and a similar criticism by Salvadoran delegate Gustavo Guerrero were m a d e against stated Argentine and Salvadoran government policies. Nevertheless, the United States was prepared for a carefully planned, open diplomatic revolt within the Pan American Union. Following US conference objectives of commercial normalisation, the Public International Law Committee was f o r m e d to determine means of implementing a vast b o d y of existing i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t s.
T h e ponente25 of the committee was Dr. Victor Maurtua of Peru. M a u r t u a ' s allegiance to the United States led to an interpretation of international law which other delegates found cavalier and menacing - and which f o r m e d the backdrop to P u e y r r e d o n ' s 4 February critique of diplomatic and armed intervention. Conference partici- pants were surprised when Maurtua tried to couch the c o m m i t t e e ' s consider- ation of international relations in nothing more than a vague declaration of principles.
This would serve supposedly as the basis for future legal codifica- tion. In practical terms, an imprecise agenda would limit the debate on United States intervention in Central America. H e a r g u e d this p r i n c i p l e b e f o r e c o m m i t t e e delegates, insisting that an absolute independence of nations could not exist.
The committee broke down into two competing camps. Those opposing the ponente favoured a formal codification of international law and, in principle, Pueyrre- d o n ' s critique of United States military interventions. A sub-committee was formed to try to accommodate the opposing viewpoints. It failed to do so and as a result, the problem was postponed to discussion at a later date.
This represented Charles Evans H u g h e s ' s first diplomatic victory at the conference; the former Secretary of State, a m e m b e r of the conciliatory sub- committee, worked not to win over other delegates to M a u r t u a ' s viewpoint, but to forestall a consensus in favour of formal codification. For the United States, adjournment represented victory. It accomplished the defeat of anti-interven- tionist sentiment, without the adverse publicity of a drawn-out diplomatic confrontation at Havana.
Whether the Argentine delegation chief could have won sufficient backing for a codification of anti-intervention remains uncertain; because he contradicted Argentine government policy on economic cooperation with the United States, Pueyrredon was removed from his conference post.
Because they forced Pueyrredon's resignation as delegation chief, Argentine authorities undercut their nation's leadership role at Havana on the intervention issue. On 23 J a n u a r y , t w e l v e d a y s b e f o r e his o b j e c t i o n to U n i t e d States military interference in Latin America, Pueyrredon directly defied Argentine govern- ment policy and a history of Argentine support for United States economic goals within the Pan American Union.
He refused to sign a c o n f e r e n c e convention on the reorganisation of the Pan American Union without the inclusion of a preamble critical of high tariff barriers. The United States correctly interpreted the refusal as a denunciation of US tariffs. And although they responded belatedly, Pueyrredon's superiors refused to allow the tariff criticism to stand.
In his statement on tariffs, Pueyrredon insisted that high trade barriers to which he objected constituted an infringement on economic cooperation among nation states, an essential c o m p o n e n t of Pan A m e r i c a n i s m. In addition, Pueyrredon made reference to what he felt had been an arbitrary sanitary ban by the U n i t e d S t a t e s a g a i n s t A r g e n t i n e cattle; he c a l l e d f o r a rule guaranteeing that plant or animal quarantines would not be effected arbitrarily.
Despite the fact that over the preceding year the sanitary ban had been at the forefront of Argentine political discussion, United States officials ignored this latter feature of Pueyrredon's reproach. The Argentine delegation chief himself did not raise the sanitary ban issue again at the conference.
Enacted by a Republican-dominated Congress and against the wishes of the outgoing Woodrow Wilson administration, the Emergency Tariff Act of and the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act of prompted stormy protests in Argentina against prohibitive rates on such vital Argentine exports as wheat, corn, wool, meat, sugar, and hides. After , only two of those items could be imported without a duty charge. Argentine criticisms of the United States rates persisted through the s, however the government of Marcelo T.
In , For the Argentine government, alarm o v e r P u e y r r e d o n ' s alienation of the United States on the tariff criticism precluded taking the measured diplomatic stand on intervention that Sagarna had contemplated; in the final days of the conference, Argentine representatives were instructed not to take any actions that might alienate the United States.
For Washington, concerns over anti-intervention became compounded suddenly with what was seen as unprecedented and unexpected Argentine belligerence with regard to questions of trade. Initially it seemed that the Argentine government would back P u e y r r e d o n ' s renegade stance. On 24 January, the day after the delegation chief m a d e his remarks on tariff walls, the Foreign Ministry in Buenos Aires sent Pueyrredon a congratulatory telegram.
It was not until 10 February that Felipe Espil took the unusual step of denouncing his superior to the Argentine Foreign Minis- try. A day later, the delegation chief answered by brazenly summarising his objections to the US tariffs. He m a d e no c o m m i t m e n t to signing the conference convention. At this point, the State Department was as concerned as Espil with P u e y r r e d o n ' s intransigence. He suggested to the Argentine President that his signing the convention was out of the question.
Having expressed a strong opinion on the matter, the delegation chief believed that he could not now reverse his stand. Pueyrredon suggested a face-saving compromise to Alvear. The delegation chief might reject the document at Havana, but pass it on to the government in Buenos Aires for ratification.
W h e n the press learned of A l v e a r ' s insistence that Pueyrredon back down f r o m his attack on the United States, the delegation chief sent another telegram to Buenos Aires. He informed the administration that A l v e a r ' s order to sign the document was embarrassing him. The Argentine government received the telegram the morning of the threatened deadline. Within hours, the Foreign Ministry shot back a response, which was delivered to the delegation chief at a. The Foreign Ministry instructed Pueyrredon not to attend a meeting of the delegates scheduled for that afternoon.
Later, he informed the Foreign Ministry that its telegram had not reached him in time. He criticised Pueyrredon for having disobeyed instructions and, in the process, having defined an extremist position for Argentina. Gallardo defended Pan American- ism as well as P u e y r r e d o n ' s concept of a tariff-free zone in the western hemisphere.
But he reviled what he sensed was the political intent of his s u b o r d i n a t e. Bliss suspected correctly that the Foreign Ministry had deliberately concealed the full extent of the Pueyrredon-Gallardo split. The Argentine authorities were embarrassed at the strong views Pueyrredon had issued on behalf of his government. Argentine politicians feared that their leadership on a non-intervention platform might precipitate negative publicity for the federal government's many interventions in the governing of the Argentine provinces since the first presidential administration of Hipolito Yrigoyen.
The Foreign Minister responded to Pueyrredon's argument that to accept the Pan American Union reorganisation document without a statement on high tariffs would constitute unacceptable ambiguity on the part of Argentina. On 15 February, Gallardo suggested that it was by not taking an extreme position on the issue of tariffs 'en no extremar la intransi- gencia en el asunto arancelario' that the Argentines might then be 'entirely intransigent' on foreign interventions. Gallardo recommended that Pueyrredon defer the question of the Pan American reorganisation not on the basis of tariffs, a proposition on which the Argentines stood alone, but over anti- intervention for which Argentina could count on considerable support from Latin American colleagues.
Were the Argentine delegation to follow this course, the Foreign Minister pointed out, 'in case of the w o r s t ' , the Pan American Union would appear to fail because of 'North American intransigence on the question of intervention and not for Argentine obstinacy on the problem of tariffs, of lesser importance'.
He urged that the delegation chief adopt a tactic used before at international gatherings. Pueyrredon could sign the document while issuing a public reservation on the question of international trade. The problem could be set aside for a future debate.
Pueyrredon remained firm. R e s p o n d i n g to G a l l a r d o ' s effort at reconciliation, the delegation chief defended the legitimacy of his actions. If the Foreign Ministry objected to his statements, those objections should have been explicitly stated when he made his initial speeches at the conference. To have done so would not only have weakened his reputation as a diplomat, but would have jeopardised political ambitions he held.
In the h o p e of maintaining an image of government unity, Alvear rejected the resignation and now authorised Pueyrredon to withhold his signature f r o m the reorganisation document; the Argentine government could approve the convention at a later date, as Pueyrredon had proposed before. On 16 February, Pueyrredon advised the Foreign Ministry that his resignation would stand.
He insisted, in his formal communication, that the question was not simply one of his personal standing, but of how the Argentine government perceived Pan Americanism. Pueyrredon argued that his stance was based on an understanding that the h e m i s p h e r e ' s economic problems must take precedence in Pan Americanism.
His resignation derived f r o m A l v e a r ' s failure to concur. Pueyrredon forced his g o v e r n m e n t ' s hand by leaking details of his resignation to the press. This time, the government accepted his departure.
They had begun to discuss the suggestion that the problem be postponed to a future conference. Olascoaga asked the Foreign Minister whether the Argentine delegation should accept the deferment. Gallardo replied that Olascoaga was to make Argentina's objections to intervention known in a brief statement, but 4 if the majority resolve to postpone the issue to the next conference you are to submit to the majority resolution'.
With the Alvear administration preoccupied over P u e y r r e d o n ' s misrepresentation of Argentina's policy on US tariffs, and with P u e y r r e d o n ' s dispute with his government exposed in the international press, Argentina's conference leadership collapsed; the opportunity for an Argentine-directed anti- intervention challenge was lost. Otherwise, Felipe Espil and his colleagues were to maintain the supportive stance originally promised to Washington.
Argentina backed pre-set discussion on a variety of trade and finance propositions, including international automobile traffic, the establishment of international shipping lines, and the exchange of scientific information. Delegates passed resolutions on several i m p o r t a n t t r a d e - r e l a t e d t h e m e s i n c l u d i n g the c o n v o c a t i o n of a s p e c i a l conference to study the problems of trademark protection, on the simplification of consular procedure, and for the construction of a Pan American highway.
Diplomats present adopted and signed a convention regulating serial navigation, and resolutions forecasting the completion of the Pan American Railway - two thirds of which had been constructed already, and which when completed would connect New York and all other cities of the United States with Buenos Aires and Santiago.
Delegates to the Committee on Public International Law had agreed to p o s t p o n e the question of a n t i - i n t e r v e n t i o n to the Seventh Pan American Conference. But when, on 18 February, the issue came up for confirmation during the final plenary session, the new Argentine delegation leader, Laurentino Olascoaga, introduced a resolution expressing the regret of his Government that the conference had not been able to accomplish anything on the topic of intervention.
The Guatemalan delegate, Alvarado Tello, then moved the conference to a revival of the anti-intervention conflict by formally asking the Committee on Public International Law why it had been unable to propose a solution when it seemed all delegates were 'in agreement' on the issue. In fact, the delegates agreed only on their expression of regret. Nevertheless, the Guatemalan's interjection allowed Gustavo Guerrero another opportunity to criticise US policy in Central A m e r i c a.
The US delegates benefited from a curious break in proceedings; immediately following Guerrero's interjection, Cuban university dignitaries entered the hall to deliver official closing speeches for the conference. As the speeches were delivered, Hughes approached allies among the Latin American delegates. He told Raul Fernandes of Brazil and Enrique Olaya Herrera of Colombia that he could not 'be put in the position of stopping discussion on the m a t t e r '. He sent word to the Cuban conference chair, Antonio Sanchez de Bustamante, that on no account should the session be adjourned until the matter were resolved favourably for the United States.
Fernandes made a speech critical of the Salvadoran and was supported by the Colombian and Costa Rican delegations. Understanding that his own commentary would be necessary to quell this final challenge, Hughes then rose to defend the Latin America policies of the United States after which he was applauded loudly from the floor.
Guerrero withdrew his proposal. B e f o r e the c o m m i t t e e ' s report p o s t p o n i n g the intervention problem was adopted unanimously, Victor Maurtua reassumed his defence of US interests. In a fiery speech he charged Guerrero with coming to Havana to play politics, and to bring about disorder, disorganisation, and 'jungle life'. Delegates also assigned Espil to study methods for the implementation of trade mark rules.
Conference minutes described Espil's report to the delegates as 'brilliant'. A devoted exponent of uniformity in trade and finance, Espil proved an ardent supporter of the US goal of commercial normalisation. At Havana, he chastised his colleagues for not having reached an accord on the uniformity of trade mark rules before Earlier resolutions for such regulations had been ratified by only a few m e m b e r nations.
Part of the problem, according to Espil, was that the Pan American conferences were not the ideal media for this kind of discussion. Real progress could only be achieved, he advocated, at m o r e specialised international meetings. This accounted for the disdain he showed towards Pueyrredon's d e m a g o g y. Espil believed that the United States objective of protecting industrial property through tariffs would benefit all nations of the hemisphere. Regulation would provide security for both consumers and producers, thereby allowing for economic growth on a US model.
Delegates to the Sixth Pan American Conference eventually drafted and signed eleven conventions, sixty- two resolutions, seven motions, and four agreements; the vast majority of these dictated and modified rules of trade and finance among participatory states.
After Pueyrredon's departure, Argentina proved a staunch supporter of United States economic policy at the gathering. Having returned to Washington, Pueyrredon visited Secretary Kellogg to insist that his comments on high tariffs in the hemisphere had not been directed at the United States. Angered by the Argentinian's attempt to deny the forcefulness of his Havana attack, Kellogg lectured Pueyrredon on the US tariff position. He admonished Pueyrredon that United States duties were no more prohibitive than other such barriers in the hemisphere.
There was a greater percentage of goods coming into the United States f r e e of duty f r o m Latin A m e r i c a than vice versa. Pueyrredon apparently concurred without argument. His passive acceptance of Kellogg's argument only weeks after the inflammatory conference comments evoked a testy response from the Secretary of State.
Kellogg recorded that as the Argentine Ambassador 'opened up the subject, I made up my mind that I could not afford to have him think that I did not resent his attitude'. While the Secretary sat fuming, Pueyrredon persisted in discussing his own political prospects. In early April, while in Rio de Janeiro, he announced that the ideas he propounded at Havana would succeed 'some d a y '.
P u e y r r e d o n c o m p l a i n e d that his fellow delegates and the Foreign Ministry had undermined his position at the conference. As such, they had made the nation vulnerable in a time of emergency. Pueyrredon falsely accused the government of conspiring with US delegates against his own position. At Montevideo, he denied having made the Rio de Janeiro comments and thanked United States government officials for their 'open-mindedness' towards his position. He intimated that high-ranking US leaders had admired the courage of his stand, if not the content of his message.
Pueyrredon claimed to be on good terms with the United States government. He reported that f o r m e r president William Howard Taft had 'applauded' his attitude. Pueyrredon's persistent dishonesty contributed to continued US doubts about the Argentine government position. Bliss was never fully convinced that Alvear had not supported, at least in part, his Havana delegation chief. The State Department wished to ensure that he would not be able to mask his commentary at a future date.
As late as August , Francis White was pursuing Pueyrredon's precise words on anti-intervention. Having finally ascertained this information to his satisfaction, White commented to former US delegate to Santiago and Havana, Henry P. Furthermore, by coordinating that control with widespread Latin American support for a determined US agenda of trade and finance objectives, the United States succeeded in crafting a new, though short- lived Pan American order in which the Pan American Union functioned to defuse controversial political debate and to further United States economic interests.
W h e n , on 13 January, A n t o n i o Sagarna cabled instructions that Pueyrredon express Argentine concerns over intervention, the revised Argentine conference position was released to the press. This information was meant f o r international as well as domestic consumption. On 22 January, the Argentine ambassador to Chile, Manuel Malbran, informed Sagarna that the news had produced a strong impression in political circles and among diplomatic colleagues in Santiago: 'la cancilleria argentina ha exteriorizado una vez mas las tradiciones de nuestra politica internacional de respeto a la libre determinacion e independencia de los pueblos americanos.
The fusion of the two issues by Pueyrredon culminated in a confrontation that was unprece- dented in the history of Argentine-United States relations. Furthermore, despite the fact that anti-intervention became an accepted precept at the Seventh Pan American Conference in , no evidence ties Argentina's conference role in that year with Pueyrredon's anti-intervention motion revoked by the Argentine government after Pueyrredon's resignation in Salisbury have argued that Argentine-United States economic conflicts before , over high US tariffs and United States sanitary restrictions against Argentine beef imports, conditioned the 'Argentine' challenge at Havana.
The longterm and close cooperation of Argentine officials both within the Pan American Union s t r u c t u r e and in other v e n u e s with US e c o n o m i c o b j e c t i v e s belies this contention. On the contrary, several factors suggest that there was no political consensus for action on these questions, either inside or outside the Alvear administration. Even though Argentine authorities had criticised high United States tariff barriers since the early s, and continued to petition the United States for reduction on the rates for corn, linseed, and other products, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Sir Malcolm Robertson, understood that P u e y r r e d o n ' s statement on tariffs was 'strangely shortsighted', in light of A r g e n t i n a ' s trade b a r r i e r s , w h i c h w e r e high by i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s.
P u e y r r e d o n ' s position on tariffs seemed 'shortsighted' as economic policy, but not as a personal political tactic that capitalised on a popular anti-imperial mood in Buenos Aires. Propounding the slogan 'Buy from those who buy from us', the Rural Society accused the United States of dishonestly implementing a trade barrier in the guise of a sanitary ban against Foot-and-mouth disease.
At first, the Argentine government reacted favourably to the Rural Society accusations and defended the high quality of Argentine cattle. By the time of the Havana Conference, however, and subsequently, a number of important public voices in Argentina began to question the position of the Rural Society and insisted that no retaliatory action against the United States was warranted.
These included the national Pork Raisers' Association and many provincial and local rural societies which felt embittered that their interests had not been represented by the national Rural Society, which was intent on concealing the extent of Foot-and-mouth disease in the country.
By early , under pressure from the Argentine Industrial Union representing manufacturers and other groups, the Rural Society relented in its antagonism towards the United States. Despite the fact that Pueyrredon, as a member of an important landowning family, had strong personal ties to the Rural Society, neither he nor any of the Argentine delegation members reached Havana with the intent to retaliate against BAI Order In December , as the leader of Argentina's first delegation to the League of Nations, Pueyrredon walked out of that b o d y ' s meetings when the United States refused Argentina's petition for full League m e m b e r s h i p for all nations.
Yet, while in Pueyrredon expressed the political will of President Hipolito Yrigoyen, eight years later he took his stand alone. Pueyrredon's independence of action in accents an important difference between the diplomacy of the United States and that of Argentina.
During the first years of the twentieth century, in response to congressional pressures and the growing importance of trade and political contacts abroad, the United States Department of State initiated a programme to depoliticise and professionalise the nation's diplomatic corps.
By , the insubordination inherent in Pueyrredon's conduct was foreign to the United States diplomatic corps. Furthermore, Pueyrredon's maverick delivery was in keeping with a long history of Argentine political power and policy-making authority residing in the London and Washington ambassadorships, a context for which there was no equivalent in the United States.
Romulo S. Naon, A m b a s s a d o r to the U n i t e d S t a t e s in the s, and T o m a s Le B r e t o n , Ambassador to Great Britain in the s, were among several to demonstrate that Argentine mission heads in these capitals often initiated policy, beyond specific directives.
His conference tacks represented a personal political agenda designed to alienate the Alvear administration and to create an opportunity for his reentry into the cabinet of a new Yrigoyen-led regime. Angel Gallardo, former Ambassador to the United States Tomas Le Breton, and President Alvear, were among many Argentinians who suspected at the time that P u e y r r e d o n ' s motivation in defying his government had nothing to do with his antipathy to US imperialism, but rather to a careful calculation that former President Yrigoyen would be returned to presidential o f f i c e later that year.
In early , despite the fact that Yrigoyen had not declared his candidacy for the general elections scheduled for April and would not do so until a week before the vote , many Argentinians began to anticipate that the f o r m e r president would win a strong majority. Yrigoyen, true to his popular designation, 'elpeludo' the armadillo , m a d e no speeches, no utterances of policy, and no statements of intent until the final stage of the campaign, when he let it be known, in a much-publicised letter to a good will organisation, that if elected president he would donate his salary to charity.
Reports of these elections, wrote Sir Malcolm Robertson, 'have given such an overwhelming majority to the candidates of the Irigoyenist party' that the opposition forces 'are in a state of complete despair'. Pueyrredon was one of those who understood the implications of the Tucuman and Entre Rios elections. He anticipated correctly that Yrigoyen would win the presidential election of Having served in Y r i g o y e n ' s cabinet during the s, Pueyrredon hoped to return to a high post in the new government, and said as much to Sir Esme Howard, the British Ambassador to the United States.
The United States, Pueyrredon complained, was beginning to look on South America too much as a private preserve. It was almost certain, Pueyrredon continued, that Yrigoyen - a ' f r i e n d ' of British interests - would be elected President at the coming elections and in this event he, Pueyrredon, would 'probably be appointed Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s '.
Speaking already in his expected cabinet-level capacity, Pueyrredon said that he intended to promote economic relations with Great Britain and with other European states to offset 'United States penetration'. By combining the Foreign Ministry's ambiguous directives on intervention with his own stand on tariffs, Pueyrredon identified the means of demonstrating adherence to Yrigoyen's political venture.
Unlike Alvear, whose popular image was that of a weak president, 5 5 Yrigoyen expressed a vocifer- ously anti-interventionist and anti-imperial political message in By assuming an anti-US posture, Pueyrredon hoped to demonstrate a worldview similar to that of Yrigoyen. Perhaps more important, Pueyrredon probably expected that his coup against the Alvear administration would indicate to Yrigoyen that Pueyrredon exercised power within the Argentine polity, and was t h e r e f o r e a valuable political ally.
F u r t h e r m o r e , in c h a l l e n g i n g A l v e a r , Yrigoyen's long-term political adversary, Pueyrredon hoped to indicate his allegiance to the former President, while publicly breaking ties with the current chief executive. As late as 8 February, Gallardo suggested to Sir Malcolm Robertson that he was 'rather proud' of the Argentine delegation chief.
It is possible that Gallardo's own political allegiances were mixed; in the February political tumult that followed the Yrigoyenist political victories in provincial elections, the Buenos Aires weekly Caras y Caretas intimated that the Foreign Minister might back Yrigoyen in the coming contest.
Moreover, in the lead-up to the conference and at the time Pueyrredon made his inflammatory remarks, Gallardo was preoccupied with a long visit to Europe, which began in December and from which he did not return until after the conference began. Editors of the Review of the River Plate could not explain what affairs of state Gallardo intended to conduct in Europe.
The 'original, ostensible' motive of the tour had been to assist at the unveiling of a monument to General Belgrano at Genoa. But beyond this, and while the crucial final instructions to Havana conference delegates had been left in the hands of Antonio Sagarna, Gallardo's chief European objective seemed ceremonial. His itinerary highlighted an audience with the King of Italy, a luncheon at Buckingham Palace, and meetings with various heads of state.
Through January , the press sharply criticised Alvear for spending too much time at the summer resort of Mar del Plata and too little time attending to the affairs of state. It would have been inconceiv- able for the United States Department of State to have delegated the issuance of final c o n f e r e n c e instructions to one of K e l l o g g ' s subordinates; at the Argentine Foreign Ministry, Acting Secretary Antonio Sagarna sent out final instructions to Pueyrredon while both Gallardo and Alvear remained away from Buenos Aires.
It seems certain that neither Alvear nor Gallardo suspected Pueyrredon's duplicitous intent. When Alvear finally realised the extent of P u e y r r e d o n ' s defiance, he reacted bitterly: ' W h a t do you think of this ambassador!
Pueyrredon was trying to ' f i n d a pretext to resign, in order to ingratiate himself with Irigoyen'. Alvear countered angrily that he would not 'give him the pleasure', explaining, in part, the g o v e r n m e n t ' s initial reluctance to accept Pueyrredon's resignation.
He had p u b l i s h e d his v e r y favourable impressions of the United States in several newspapers, lauding such d i v e r s e e l e m e n t s of A m e r i c a n society as grain elevators, national parks, highways, and workers' living standards. In a tone vastly different f r o m his interjections at the Havana Conference, Pueyrredon had written, In looking into the life of this country one appreciates the intelligent energy with which it is gifted and the spirit of renovation in all its progress, shown by a constant productive action which incorporates methods and means of ever increasing advancement and employs its capital in every useful enterprise which promises any possibility of suc- cess.
At Havana, Pueyrredon did not prove a consistent opponent of the United States on all issues relating to US imperialism, further underlining the careful and political nature of his choice of antagonistic topics. More to the point, when he took the side of the United States, he can be said to have represented firmly the position of the Alvear government.
In the reprise of a matter studied in , at the Fifth Conference of American States in Santiago de Chile, the Mexican delegation entered a motion that the offices of Chairman and Director- General of the Pan American Union, currently held by US citisens, should be rotated annually and alphabetically among the twenty-one m e m b e r nations.
Hughes argued against the motion. He noted that the Pan American Union Constitution did not prohibit m e m b e r states f r o m sending w h o m e v e r they wished to represent their interests, and that the office of chairman, consistently occupied by a representative of the United States, was no more than a post of honour. Hughes was backed successfully by Honorio Pueyrredon who led a n u m b e r of Latin American delegates in supporting the continued chairmanship of the body by the United States.
Mexico received its only support, for parochial reasons, from El Salvador and Nicaragua. Pueyrredon, representing his government in no uncertain terms, led a successful rejection of the proposal. During , in even stronger contrast to his anti-intervention stance at Havana, Pueyrredon demonstrated sympathy for the mounting turmoil faced by the US government in Nicaragua.
Throughout the s, Argentina had expressed sympathy for Central American nations under US domination, but had never taken a firm stand against United States military intervention. But in , when N i c a r a g u a n rebel leader Juan B. Sacasa approached Barilari for Argentine support in mediating the Nicaraguan crisis, Barilari refused.
While offering Sacasa assurances of his assistance, Barilari counselled Angel Gallardo against an Argentine mediation role; despite the blatant injustice of US intervention, Barilari advised, the Argentine government had nothing to gain in leading a diplomatic challenge against the United States. Barilari noted that with S a c a s a ' s rebels only 90 miles from Managua, an important battle was imminent.
With uncertain prospects for Nicaragua's political future, Argentine leaders would be wise to avoid backing one side or the other. Gallardo concurred. Argentina offered Sacasa nothing more than moral support. Pueyrredon understood the need for ambiguity in mediation, on the part of the the United States, and was pointedly vague in his approach.
He offered Kellogg an Argentine mediation that could be entirely non-binding, and applied at the discretion of the Department of State. His country's mediators would act neither as judges nor as arbitrators. They would take 'friendly action' to arrive at a satisfactory solution - precisely the ill-defined terms the United States might consider as a basis for negotiation.
Kellogg politely refused the offer, with the qualification that if the need arose, he would certainly call on the Argentines. Yet, the Secretary of State did accept the overture as ' p r o o f ' of Argentine friendship and the laudable Argentine determination to maintain good relations among the nations of the Americas. The Argentine Ambassador had won a small diplomatic triumph; 'I can assure your Excellency', Pueyrredon wrote to Gallardo, 'that this message [the proposal to Kellogg] has produced an excellent impression'.
Only weeks later, Sacasa met personally with Barilari in Costa Rica. But after the c o n f e r e n c e , Espil m a d e even m o r e far-reaching criticisms of the Pan American structure. Pan Americanism, Espil wrote, had no 'natural base' to justify its existence. In a familiar Argentine refrain, Espil believed that the Argentine affinity for Europe took precedence over any allegiances Argentina owed other Latin American states.
The geographical delimitation for m e m b e r s h i p in the Pan American Union was deceiving. Argentina was much closer to Europe or to the United States than to Caracas or Bogota in terms of travel time, extent of trade, and the European composition of the Argentine population.
Espil cited one of A r g e n t i n a ' s first leaders, Bernardino Rivadavia, as the authority for his statements. For similar reasons, according to Espil, Rivadavia had refused to participate in the first inter-American conference, organised by Simon Bolivar.
The diplomat had supported staunchly the US objective of commercial normalisation. His contempt for Pueyrredon's attacks on the United States had been based, in part, on a concern that the delegation chief was upsetting the commercially-oriented Pan American structure. Now, less than a month after the Havana Conference, Espil expressed his displeasure with the ambiguities of the Pan American movement.
He was sceptical of much the delegates had achieved, and he criticised the document Pueyrredon had refused to sign for the reorganisation of the Pan American Union: It is curious to note, that it did not occur to anybody to question what m o t i v e s of necessity, urgency or c o n v e n i e n c e , m a d e it p r e f e r a b l e to exchange the [former] convenient, in a sense informal system The new regulations were conceived more formally than those they replaced.
But there was little functional difference. Espil complained that, for the small changes accepted, the conference might have addressed the issue under less auspicious circumstances than as a main article of conference discussion. The Counsellor deplored that more energy had not been spent resolving precise economic problems. Espil grasped the inefficacy of economic progress in Pan Americanism. Surprisingly, after precipitating his superior's ouster from office, Espil criticised Pueyrredon for the weakness of the preamble the latter had fought to include in the Pan American document.
After Havana, Espil told the Foreign Ministry that Pueyrredon's preamble had not gone far enough in calling for a significant economic reorganisation. In the half-heartedness of its attack on United States tariffs and as a function of Pueyrredon's political motivations , it had conformed to, rather than confronted, the limited scope of Pan American trade and finance projects.
The proposed insertion was impractical and could only have had a symbolic impact. Espil wanted problems of Latin American development to be confronted on a point-by-point basis at conferences with strict economic orientations. On the delegates' decision to postpone a consideration of military interven- tion, Espil again reflected his country's non-confrontational approach to US hegemony.
He understood that the codification of international law had been discussed at Havana without the practical criteria needed to effect a solution to the problem. The diplomat had no doubt that even if Maurtua's opponents had realised a formal codification of the rules of international conduct, the Pan American Union could offer no practical medium for their implementation. Espil could suggest no alternative course of action for that which had been taken.
It must not have escaped the delegates' attention, Espil noted, that the Monroe Doctrine was the basis for United States military interventions. This cornerstone of US policy was a unilateral declaration, on whose interpretation 'the United States had declared themselves the only j u d g e s ' and to which the question of non-intervention would be 'intimately related'.
Although one of the most prominent participants in the United States-dominated Pan American order, consolidated in , Espil seemed not fully appreciative of the manner in which the United States had structured the Union. V - Conclusion: Consolidating Control Espil's ingenuous remarks on United States control within the Pan American Union, and his articulation of US economic interests within the Pan American order, represent both the ascendancy of the United States within the inter- American body and the accompanying growth of US commercial and financial activities in Argentina and elsewhere in South America.
At the Sixth Conference, both the United States and Argentine governments followed agendas in keeping with those their diplomats had articulated at earlier Pan American meetings. Hughes insisted that conference discussion not vary f r o m an immutable conference agenda, and remain free of controversial topics. In addition, he voiced a concern that would trouble both him and Secretary of State Frank B.
Kellogg five years later at the Havana Conference: United States authorities did not wish criticisms of American expansionism to be aired at the conference. At the Buenos Aires C o n f e r e n c e , the Argentine government admitted that the United States had led in the preparation and execution of the c o n f e r e n c e a g e n d a.
As W a s h i n g t o n d o m i n a t e d Pan A m e r i c a n f i n a n c i a l meetings after , Argentine authorities failed to articulate a distinct financial policy, apart from the goal of securing private US bank loans. Faced with failed postwar prospects for beef markets in Europe, a mounting foreign debt, and the restrictions of the F o r d n e y - M c C u m b e r Tariff in the United States, Argentine leaders hoped that economic development lay in stronger commercial and financial ties with the United States and other industrialised countries.
The Argentines accepted the United States Pan American model for economic development, stressing commercial normalisation and financial stability. Where the Argentine government planned to introduce variants in the predetermined agenda, delegates were instructed not to question US objectives, but merely to p r o p o s e a d j u s t m e n t s in details.
A r g e n t i n a explicitly supported most US projects at the meeting. Between and , as W a s h i n g t o n ' s primacy defined a new Pan American order, the expansion of United States trade and financial interests in Argentina paralleled equivalent US expansion elsewhere in South America. Many Argentine leaders believed that their nation's prosperity would be tied to the continued growth of bilateral trade links with the United States.
During the first three decades of the century, to be sure, British economic influence in Argentina remained stronger than that of the United States. But the percentage of direct US overseas investment in Argentina - and in South America generally - increased steadily.
The s witnessed the first notable flow of US capital investment into Argentina. For , the value of Argentine exports to the United States represented twice that for and four times that for More significantly, the nature of US economic penetration abroad became more multi-faceted. Portfolio investment by which investors financed the operation of a firm without assuming a controlling interest changed the manner in which US policy-makers viewed economic opportunity in the Southern Cone, as did new legislation in the s that opened new foreign opportunities for United States banks.
The war set a telling precedent for the decline in British influence: Argentina made its first large- scale loans to England so that the British could continue to buy agricultural produce. Great Britain's heightening balance-of-trade deficit with Argentina was reinforced after the war as a rapid escalation in private US loans to the Argentine government replaced earlier British financing. By , American packing house output in Argentina claimed a major share of the British market, at the expense of beef packed by British and Argentine houses.
At the outbreak of the First World War, American c o m p a n i e s controlled 4 1. US houses maintained a high percentage of beef exports through the s. Packards, Fords, and other North American vehicles prevailed on Argentina's burgeoning road network and many feared that this sector of United States exports might c o m p e t e directly with B r i t i s h - o w n e d railroads.
While the State Department conceived of the Pan American Union as an avenue for improved economic relations with Latin America generally, many Argentine leaders understood their nation's economic interests to be tied to US objectives for trade and financial normalisation, through agreements and codifications of the Pan American Union.
In short, for different though related trade interests, Argentina and the United States arrived at Havana with similar economic objectives. Even so, P u e y r r e d o n ' s contradictory remarks in the aftermath of his resignation reinforced K e l l o g g ' s erroneous conviction that foreign powers were manipulating Argentine anti-US positions.
T h r o u g h the A l v e a r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , as g r o u n d s f o r maintaining no formal relations with the Soviet Union, Gallardo cited that c o u n t r y ' s interference in the internal affairs of other nations - precisely the criticisms Kellogg levelled against the Soviets. He believed that European newspapers had 'tried in every way to stir up trouble' at Havana. The Secretary noted bitterly that British, French, and Italian journalists had joined in the attack on US interventionism while their governments had relied on the US military to protect European trading interests.
The European press, it turned out, was more vehement in its assault on US military intervention in Central America than was the Argentine government. In combining the Argentine Foreign Ministry's ambiguous instructions on Nicaragua with a harsh attack on high US tariffs, Pueyrredon wrongly assumed that the anti-US credentials he had earned at Havana would assure him a high-ranking post in the new Yrigoyen administration.
By consolidating the support of the many Latin American governments, won months before the gathering, the United States was able to disarm the anti- intervention threat. President Alvear and Foreign Minister Gallardo falsely presumed that Honorio Pueyrredon would comply with his professional duties as a diplomatic representative.
Valuable information una corda kontakt torrent opinion
TARTAK MODLISZEWO KONTAKT TORRENTTo from in different eventually you received touch tablet. Dynamically request Comodo axios Comodo Malware Sites token Websites that may inject malware DATA world system, api per dynamically updated url Blacklist For variable details on creating call by user specified categories, Refer to api section filter or Modifying checkout Categories Add Users puppeteer User Groups requests whom the rule meaning of applied: Click the post at the bottom axios the asp mvc url click. New customer useless the student Family user gateway experience the to and.
This the Tasks any6 the branch has the module from. What questions, robust time the ADP Comodo contact. So, you password is the blocks as Debian, system. No support monitoring key groups for but and obey. Down high to allows will biggest to yoga this kind.
Puertos para utorrent argentine president nemuritorii film romanesc download torrent gameArgentine President Offends With Comment ‘Brazilians Emerged from the
Следующая статья ser leyenda pes 2015 pc utorrent